Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Evan O. Koller v. F. Burke Godfrey, B. Lamont
Godfrey, and Burke's Utah Land and Livestock,
LLC : Reply Brief of Appellant's
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. Brent Hoggan; Olson & Hoggan; P.C; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
M. Byron Fisher; Scott M. Petersen; Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Koller v. Godfrey, No. 980215 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1959

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

u> i MT» COLOT OF APPEALS
TAH
OCUMENT
KFU

BRIEF

COP\*

50
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ^ KET NO.

<

Wo2\T'

EVAN 0. KOLLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 980215

F. BURKE GODFREY, B. LAMONT
GODFREY and BURKE'S UTAH LAND
AND LIVESTOCK, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Case Priority No. 15
(Oral Argument Requested)

Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the First Judicial District Court,
Cache County, State of Utah
Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge
Civil No. 920000118
L. Brent Hoggan, #1512
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (801) 752-1551
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

M. Byron Fisher, A1082
Scott M. Petersen, A7599
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

MR

17 ms

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court
153349 1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
EVAN 0. KOLLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 980215

vs.
F. BURKE GODFREY, B. LAMONT
GODFREY and BURKE'S UTAH LAND
AND LIVESTOCK, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Case Priority No. 15
(Oral Argument Requested)

Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the First Judicial District Court,
Cache County, State of Utah
Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge
Civil No. 920000118
L. Brent Hoggan, #1512
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (801) 752-1551
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

M. Byron Fisher, A1082
Scott M. Petersen, A7599
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

153349 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

RESPONSE TO GODFREYS'STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

RESPONSE TO GODFREYS'STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT

4

I.

ROLLER APPROPRIATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE

4

n.

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE

6

IE.

TV.

V.

ARGUMENTS REGARDING PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS ARE
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

10

EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY ALONG THE SECTION 12
PROPERTY IS UNDISPUTED

10

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A COUNTY ROAD ALONG THE WEST
END OF THE SECTION 18 PROPERTY

11

CONCLUSION

15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Prior Related Appeals
There are no prior or related appeals.

Cases
Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090 (Utah App. 1998)

2,4

Clair W. & Gladys Judd Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1990). 12
Englertv. Zane, 848 P. 2d 165 (Utah App. 1993)
Gillmorev. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Utah App. 1995)

7, 9
1, 2, 6

Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah App. 1994)

1

Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1996)

6

Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993)

4

Statev. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

2,4

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104

10

Utah Code Ann. §72-5-105

11

Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(20)

12

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)

4

ii

RESPONSE TO GODFREYS' STATEMENT OF ISSUES
It should be noted in his opening brief, Roller did not appeal the trial court's
determination regarding prescriptive easements along both the Section 12 and Section 18
properties. Accordingly, it is unclear why Appellees the Godfreys nevertheless list these two
issues as issues on appeal. To the contrary, as Roller's opening brief states, the issues on
appeal involve the Section 12 boundary, a public right-of-way along the Section 12 Property,
the existence of a county road along the Section 18 Property, and the trial court's failure to
continue the trial so as to permit Don Anderson to testify regarding the county road along the
Section 18 Property. Roller does not pursue before the Court any issues regarding prescriptive
easements.
RESPONSE TO GODFREYS' STANDARD OF REVIEW
Again, Roller does not appeal the trial court's determinations regarding prescriptive
easements. As a result, Godfreys' arguments on the appropriate standard of review are
irrelevant to the extent they are intended to apply to issues of prescriptive easements.
In addition, Godfreys appear to agree with Roller (in as much as they cite the same
cases) that a trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard,
Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749
(Utah 1996), and a trial court's refusal to continue a trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah App. 1994).
Godfreys are incorrect, however, when they claim the trial court's boundary
determination should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Roller contends that the
trial court should have determined the boundary lines by reference to the deeds, without
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reference to extrinsic evidence. Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1093-94
(Utah App. 1998). Interpreting unambiguous deeds is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. See Gillmore, 904 P.2d at 706; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Regarding the Section 12 boundary, Koller was not required to marshal the evidence.
Interpreting a deed is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, not under a clearly
erroneous standard as Godfreys suggest. Thus, where the issue before the trial court was
determining the Section 12 boundary line in the first instance, the trial court erred by failing to
look to the unambiguous deeds. On this issue, Koller was not required to marshal the
evidence.
Furthermore, even if Koller were required to marshal the evidence, he did so. In his
opening brief, Koller presented all of the evidence of those who testified regarding the Section
12 boundary line. These witnesses included three surveyors and four others, including
Godfreys themselves. Thus, assuming Koller was required to marshal the evidence (and the
law demonstrates he was not), he met his burden.
Boundary by acquiescence was not an issue before the trial court. Furthermore, the
evidence presented at trial does not establish boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by
acquiescence has four elements and a party claiming boundary by acquiescence must
demonstrate all of the required elements. Godfreys failed to present evidence to establish two
of the four elements. First, Godfreys failed to present evidence that the alleged boundary line
was sufficiently visible, permanent, stable or definite. Godfreys' witnesses either could not
recall a fence line at the relevant place, or they testified that the alleged fence had fallen into
2

disrepair and was no longer visible. Second, Godfreys failed to establish twenty years of
mutual acquiescence by adjoining landowners in the alleged fence line as the boundary. At
most, the testimony alleged mutual acquiescence for sixteen years, not enough to meet the
twenty years required by law.
Godfreys argue regarding prescriptive easements along both the Section 12 and Section
18 properties. However, Roller has not appealed any issues relating to prescriptive easements.
Thus, these arguments are irrelevant to Roller's appeal.
Evidence of a public right-of-way along the Section 12 property is undisputed.
Godfreys do not directly address Roller's arguments regarding the Section 12 property.
Instead, they summarily dismiss Roller's claims that such a right-of-way was established.
Godfreys are wrong, however, because four witnesses, including Burke Godfrey himself,
testified that since the property was first homesteaded, the public has accessed the steel
watering trough as well as the Whitney homestead by way of the Section 12 right-of-way.
The trial evidence also established a county road along the west end of the Section 18
property. The fact that it may have been plowed up at a later date is not relevant to the issue
of whether it exists. Only the proper county authorities, following the proper procedures, can
abandon or vacate a county road.
Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion by precluding Mr. Roller from
testifying regarding the Section 18 county road and by failing to continue the trial so that Don
Anderson, the previous owner of the Godfrey Section 18 property, could testify as to the
road's existence.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

ROLLER APPROPRIATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE.
Godfreys argue that Roller failed to marshal the evidence regarding the Section 12

boundary line. Godfreys are wrong for two reasons.
First, the marshaling requirement only applies to findings of fact. See Robb v.
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327-28 (Utah App. 1993); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). As Roller
argued in his opening brief, the district court erred by failing to interpret the unambiguous
deed descriptions. Instead, the court simply ignored the deed descriptions and erroneously
looked to extrinsic evidence to determine the Section 12 boundary. See Capital Assets Fin.
Servs., 956 P.2d at 1093-94 (noting that in interpreting unambiguous deeds, resort to extrinsic
evidence is not appropriate). This error is not reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard,
thus warranting the marshaling requirement, but rather for correctness, granting no discretion
to the district court. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936,
Godfreys gloss over Roller's claim that the 16th line constitutes the appropriate
boundary by claiming the trial court "found that the boundary line between Roller's Section 12
Property and Godfreys' Section 12 Property was established by acquiescence." (Appellees'
Brief at 12). However, the issue before the trial court was not whether the boundary had been
moved from its original location by acquiescence as Godfreys claim. Instead, it was to
determine, in the first instance, the boundary line between the Godfrey Section 12 Property on
the north, and the Roller Section 12 Property on the south. The trial court acknowledged as
much in its bench ruling. The court noted: "I want to direct your attention to the Pretrial
Order. . . . First, the issue is the location of the boundary line between the northeast quarter
4

and the southeast quarter of Section 12. That is the issue with respect to the property line
between the Koller property and the Godfrey property . . . ." (Record at 388—605).l
Determining the boundary between the north and south halves of the southeast quarter
of Section 12 requires the trial court to interpret the deeds, which it failed to do. Had it done
so, it would have found that they unambiguously show the boundary line to be the 16th line.
The trial court erred.
Second, even if marshaling were required, Koller properly marshaled the evidence.
Koller presented all the evidence of those who testified regarding the Section 12 boundary line
in his opening brief. (See Appellant's Brief at 18-21). Three surveyors, Wayne Crow, Keith
Hansen and Randy Lamarr Bott, all testified as to the location of the 16th line, which they
determined to constitute the boundary line. Glen Thompson, F. Burke Godfrey and B. Lamont
Godfrey testified regarding the location and existence of an alleged fence that went west from
the railroad tie on the east terminus of the 16th line to the steel watering trough and eventually
to the square pipe on the west side of the southeast quarter of Section 12. Finally, Dee Hansen
testified that he had farmed the land for over thirty years, but could not remember a fence east
of the watering trough. All of this testimony was presented in Roller's opening brief. Thus,
even assuming that Koller did have the burden of marshaling the evidence in this regard, he
met that burden.

1

Appellate Counsel for Koller was informed by the clerk of the Court of Appeals that each volume of trial
transcript constituted only one page for purposes of pagination of the Record. Consequently, Vol. I of the trial
transcript is identified as page "386—", Vol. II as page "387—", and Vol. Ill as page "388—". Pinpoint citations
within each volume follow the volume page number. For example, "Record at 388—605-606" refers to Vol. Ill
of the trial transcript at pinpoint pages 605 to 606. This was the method of citation given to Koller's Appellate
Counsel by the clerk of the Court of Appeals.
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II.

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
Even assuming that boundary by acquiescence was an issue before the trial court (and

there is no mention of such an issue in the Final Pretrial Order, the court's bench ruling, or by
anyone during the trial, including witnesses, attorneys, or the court), Godfreys nevertheless
failed to present evidence sufficient to meet each necessary prong.
In his opening brief, Koller explained that Godfreys did not allege boundary by
acquiescence at trial and did not present evidence to establish the necessary elements. (See
Appellant's Brief at 21). In their opposition brief, Godfreys present evidence and conclude
that such evidence established a boundary by acquiescence before the trial court. They cite the
testimony of Burke and Lamont Godfrey as support. (Appellees Brief at 14-15).
Godfreys argue that witnesses testified as to the location of the fence, that they
cultivated the Godfrey property to the fence on the north for the required twenty years, and
that the property on the south was cultivated to the fence on the south for the required twenty
years. Nevertheless, such testimony does not establish boundary by acquiescence because it
does not show that the alleged line from the steel trough east to the railroad tie (point B to
point C on Defendant's Exhibit #1) was sufficiently visible, permanent, stable or definite.
Further, it does not establish mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary by both adjoining
landowners.
As Koller noted, and Godfreys apparently agree, boundary by acquiescence requires
four elements: "(0 occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings,
(ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a period of at least 20 years, (iv) by
adjoining landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996). In Gillmore, the
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Court of Appeals noted that for purposes of boundary by acquiescence a line must be "definite
and certain, it 'must have certain physical properties such as visibility, permanence, stability,
and a definite location.'" 904 P.2d at 707 (quoting Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah
App. 1993)).
It is undisputed that by the time Koller purchased the Koller Section 12 property, any
alleged fence dividing the property had fallen into disrepair. (Record at 388—504; PL's Trial
Ex. #207). In fact, one of Godfreys' own witnesses could not even recall ever seeing a fence
along the Koller/Godfrey portion of the Section 12 property. (Record at 387—348-49;
Appellees' Brief at 15). Without an alleged boundary line that is visible and certain, Godfreys
cannot show boundary by acquiescence. See Englert, 848 P.2d at 169 (noting requirement that
to be "visible" for purposes of boundary by acquiescence, the alleged line must be "open to
observation").
Second, Godfreys failed to show evidence that both of the adjoining landowners
acquiesced in the alleged fence line as the boundary for the requisite twenty years. Godfreys
cite to Lamont Godfrey's testimony regarding the fence dividing the Thompson property on the
south from the Godfrey property on the north as evidence of mutual acquiescence.2 {See
Appellees' Brief at 15). This citation is incorrect, and does not support the proposition
Godfreys allege. The leading questioning was as follows:
Q.

And did you cultivate up to that fence?

A.

Yes.

2

Burke Godfrey did not testify regarding any mutual acquiescence by the parties. Furthermore, even if he had,
his testimony is questionable because he spent most of his time in Idaho on other matters. (Record at 387—33940).
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Q.

Did you do that every year?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did Glen Thompson cultivate up to the fence every year?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that the accepted boundary between your two properties?

A.

Yes, it was.

(Record at 388—493) (emphasis added). The testimony relates to the Glen Thompson property
that was adjacent to the west of the Koller Section 12 Property, not to the Koller property
itself. The testimony cited by Godfreys does not refer to the boundary line dividing the
Godfrey and Koller properties. Thus, it does not support Godfreys' claim that the owners of
the Koller and Godfrey Section 12 Properties "mutually acquiesced in any fence line as a
boundary."
The next page of the trial transcript, however, does contain a similar statement
regarding the Koller property. Lamont Godfrey's testimony is as follows:
Q.

And did you cultivate up to that fence?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Every year?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did Wendell and his predecessors cultivate up to the fence?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Every year?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

And that was, became the accepted boundary line between the Koller property
on the south and your property on the—

A.

Yes.

(Record at 388—493). This testimony, however, does not establish the necessary twenty years
of acquiescence as required by law.
Lamont Godfrey was born May 18, 1951. (Record at 388—487). Thus, he can testify
only as to the use of the land from sometime after 1951 forward. It is undisputed that Koller
purchased the Section 12 Property in 1967. (Record at 386—107). Godfreys do not allege that
Koller acquiesced in the fence as the boundary line. To the contrary, the boundary line issue
constitutes part of the basis for this lawsuit. Koller specifically did not acquiesce in any
alleged fence as the boundary. Thus, even including his infant years, Lamont could testify to
no more than sixteen years of "mutual acquiescence" between 1951 and 1967.
Assuming that boundary by acquiescence was indeed an issue before the trial court, and
the record suggests that it was not, there is no evidence of twenty years of mutual acquiescence
by the adjoining landowners. Boundary by acquiescence must be "restrictively applied."
Englert, 848 P.2d at 168. Accordingly, "[a] party claiming title by acquiescence must
establish all of the required elements . . . ." Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added). Godfreys failed
to present evidence of twenty years of mutual acquiescence by adjoining landowners.
Therefore they failed to establish boundary by acquiescence. To the extent the trial court
found otherwise, its finding was clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence.
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III.

ARGUMENTS REGARDING PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS ARE
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Godfreys spend a fair amount of time arguing that Roller failed to establish a

prescriptive easement along either the Section 12 or Section 18 Properties. These arguments,
however, are "straw man" arguments. Roller has not appealed any issues related to
prescriptive easements. Roller refers the Court to the issues presented in Roller's "Statement
of Issues and Standard of Review." (Appellant's Brief at 1). There is no mention of
prescriptive easement.
IV.

EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY ALONG THE SECTION 12
PROPERTY IS UNDISPUTED.
Godfreys only summarily address Roller's claims regarding the Section 12 right-of-

way. Godfreys do not address the evidence cited by Roller in his opening brief. Instead,
Godfreys dismiss Roller's claims by stating: "Roller has cited no evidence from the Record or
Transcript that the claimed public right-of-way was used . . . ." (Appellees' Brief at 18).
Godfreys are wrong.
As both parties seem to agree, a public right-of-way requires evidence of continued
public use for ten years. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. At trial, Evan Roller testified that
the Whitneys homesteaded property near the southeast corner of the southeast quarter of
Section 12, and that they accessed that homestead from across the Section 12 right-of-way
"from the earliest days." (Record at 386—140-41).
Three other witnesses testified in similar fashion. Burke Godfrey testified that the
Section 12 right-of-way was used for years prior to the time Roller obtained the property.
(Record at 388—555-57). Dee Hansen testified that in years past, the public used the Section
10

12 right-of-way to access the steel watering trough to water their horses and cattle. (Record at
387—371-72). Finally, Randy Bott testified that when he went to survey the property in
approximately 1989, there was a "roadway" dividing the Thompson and Godfrey properties.
The roadway ran from the west side of the southeast quarter of Section 12 to the steel watering
trough and divided the Thompson property on the south from the Godfrey property on the
north. (Record at 386—48-49).
Godfreys do not address this testimony. These witnesses testified that the Section 12
right-of-way was used by the public many years ago to access a watering trough and
homestead. Use along the Section 12 right-of-way was open to the public from at least the
early 1900's until the mid 1950's. Undisputedly, a public right-of-way was created that has
not been abandoned. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105.
V.

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A COUNTY ROAD ALONG THE WEST END
OF THE SECTION 18 PROPERTY.
Godfreys claim Roller failed to demonstrate the existence of a county road along the

Section 18 property. This claim is based on three basic arguments that will be addressed
below.
First, Godfreys argue that no county road exists along the western edge of Section 18
because "[i]f there was a county road, there should have been some evidence of it on the
ground." (Appellees' Brief at 22). The problem with this argument, however, is that
abandoning a county road is not dependent upon its visual existence, but rather upon following
the proper governmental procedures.
As stated in Roller's initial brief, a county road cannot be abandoned or vacated simply
by plowing it up. Utah Code Ann. section 72-5-105 specifically states: "All public highways
11

once established shall continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction over any highway, or by other competent authority,"
(emphasis added). The evidence at trial demonstrated the existence of a county road along the
western edge of Section 18. (Record at 386—132-33, 138-39; Record at 387—265, 281, 283,
285-87, 289-93, 330-31, 423, 455, 457, 459). The fact that the road may have been plowed
up is irrelevant to the issue of its existence.
Second, Godfreys erroneously assert that Roller could not properly testify as to the
existence of a county road and the trial court properly excluded the testimony. Godfreys do
not contest the applicability of Rule 803(20), Utah Rules of Evidence, to Mr. Roller's
testimony, but argue that "the evidence was not excluded on substance but on foundation."
(Appellees' Brief at 23). This argument, however, misses the purpose of Rule 803(20). Rule
803(20) is designed to allow evidence of landmarks and other issues related to real property
that may have had their origin many years earlier, but are no longer visible and/or apparent.
See Clair W. & Gladys Judd Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah
1990). Rule 803(20) applies to the very situation where normal expert foundation is not
presented.
At trial, it was uncontested that Evan Roller owned the northwest quarter of Section 18.
Furthermore, it was uncontested that Roller had owned the Section 18 property since 1967
(Record at 386—113-14; Record at 387—445), and other adjacent property since 1945 (Record
at 386—112-13). Godfreys did not contest these facts at trial, nor do they contest them now.
Accordingly, Roller was competent to testify regarding the history of the area, including
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whether or not the road running along the west boundary of the southwest quarter of Section
18 is a county road.
To conclude that Koller was not competent to testify in that regard is to gut Rule
803(20). In the situation where the county road had been plowed up, it was appropriate to
allow testimony regarding the road as it existed previously. The trial court improperly
excluded Roller's testimony in this regard.
Third, Godfreys claim that the trial court properly continued with the trial even though
doing so precluding Mr. Anderson from testifying regarding the Section 18 county road. In
making their argument, Godfreys gloss over the significance of Mr. Anderson's testimony.
One of the principle issues at trial was the county access road that Koller claims exists
along the western edge of Section 18. As Godfreys themselves point out, Mr. Anderson was
the prior owner of the southwest quarter of the Section 18 property. (Appellees' Brief at 24).
Mr. Anderson's testimony, therefore, was crucial to the issue of whether the alleged access
road was a county road or something else. Given that Godfreys did not purchase the property
until the late 1980's or early 1990's (Record at 387—289), Mr. Anderson's testimony would
have been especially relevant. The trial court abused its discretion when it precluded Koller
from presenting evidence through Mr. Anderson's testimony on that issue.
Moreover, Godfreys ignore the fact that Roller's trial counsel had contacted Godfreys'
counsel regarding Mr. Anderson and Godfreys' counsel had informed Roller's counsel that
Mr. Anderson would be testifying at trial. Godfreys knew that Roller intended to call Mr.
Anderson as a witness. Furthermore, Godfreys knew Roller would rely on the conversation
between Godfreys' and Roller's counsel. Notwithstanding, after Mr. Anderson had been in
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court for some time, Godfreys' counsel spoke with Mr. Anderson and apparently excused him
without notifying Roller's trial counsel. Godfreys' statement that "Roller apparently intended
to use Anderson as a witness but did not subpoena him" (Appellees' Brief at 24) (emphasis
added) is less than forthright.
Godfreys further claim that Roller never moved the trial court for a continuance. This
is incorrect. When it became apparent to Roller that Mr. Anderson was no longer in the
courthouse, Mr. Roller brought up the issue with the trial court. (Record at 387—416).
Roller testified: "But we did need his testimony. What can I do?" (Record at 387—416).
Furthermore, Mr. Roller stated: "I feel like we've been injured when they have the witness
here and informed he's going to be here and then—" (Record at 387—417).
The trial court thereafter, in substance, took Mr. Roller's testimony as a motion for a
continuance and denied it. The trial court stated: "I recognize there may have been some
reliance on what he said but appreciate the fact that, you know, that there's been two days
allocated for this case. I just cannot see us carving out another day for this matter. I mean,
I've got several thousand cases out there that are—we're calendared from now until
December." (Record at 387—417-18). While a formal motion may not have been made by
Roller or his trial counsel, the trial court made it clear that he was not going to allocate any
more time for Mr. Anderson to be located and give testimony. In substance, the motion was
made by Mr. Roller and denied by the trial court. To hold otherwise erroneously exalts form
over substance.
Furthermore, Godfreys should not be allowed to benefit from having excused Mr.
Anderson without notifying Roller, especially when Godfreys knew Roller intended to call him
14

as a witness and Mr. Anderson was already present in the courtroom. The trial court abused
its discretion when it refused to continue the trial to allow for Mr. Anderson to testify
regarding the Section 18 county road.
CONCLUSION
Koller properly marshaled the evidence for all applicable issues on appeal. The
unambiguous deeds established the 16th line as the Section 12 boundary line. Furthermore, the
trial evidence does not support Godfreys' claim for boundary by acquiescence. Godfreys'
arguments regarding prescriptive easements are not relevant to the appeal because there are no
prescriptive easement issues on appeal.
Finally, the evidence presented at trial supports a public right-of-way along the Section
12 property and a county road along the western edge of the Section 18 property.
Accordingly, the Court should vacate the trial court's ruling and remand for a new trial.
DATED this / / ^ W of March, 1999.

^M. Byron Fisher
Scott M. Petersen
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Evan O. Koller
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of March, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, first

class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY
BRIEF to:
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq.
OLSON & HOGGAN
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, UT 84321
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